Reasoning with inconsistency involves some compromise on classical logic. There is a range of proposals for logics (called paraconsistent logics) for reasoning with inconsistency each with pros and cons. Selecting an appropriate paraconsistent logic for an application depends on the requirements of the application. Here we review paraconsistent logics for the potentially signi cant application area of technology for structured text. Structured text is a general concept that is implicit in a variety of approaches to handling information. Syntactically, an item of structured text is a number of grammatically simple phrases together with a semantic label for each phrase. Items of structured text may be nested within larger items of structured text. The semantic labels in a structured text are meant to parameterize a stereotypical situation, and so a particular item of structured text is an instance of that stereotypical situation. Much information is potentially available as structured text including tagged text in XML, text in relational and object-oriented databases, and the output from information extraction systems in the form of instantiated templates. In this review paper, we formalize the concept of structured text, and then focus on how we can identify inconsistency in items of structured text, and reason with these inconsistencies. Then we review key approaches to paraconsistent reasoning, and discuss the application of them to reasoning with inconsistency in structured text.
Introduction
Inconsistency is a ubiquitous phenomenon in the real-world, and so as computers are used in ever more sophisticated roles, it is an increasingly important issue in computer science. Inconsistency is not necessary a bad thing. Rather an inconsistency can be useful. For example, it can be an alert to a potential problem, or o er the basis for con ict resolution, or indicate an interesting anomalous situation. For a discussion on the value of inconsistency see GH91, GH93] .
The best approach to inconsistency is not necessarily immediate eradication. Rather, we need to analyse each inconsistency and then act on it in a context-sensitive way. In this paper, we will consider some of the issues of handling inconsistency, and in particular look at ways that we can reason in the presence of inconsistency, analyse inconsistency, and act on inconsistency. In order to compare proposals for reasoning with inconsistency, it is worthwhile considering the needs of applications. Di erent logics are appropriate for di erent applications. Here we focus on the potentially signi cant application area of technology for structured text.
Syntactically, an item of structured text is a data structure containing a number of grammatically simple phrases together with a semantic label for each phrase. The set of semantic labels in a structured text is meant to parameterize a stereotypical situation, and so a particular item of structured text is an instance of that stereotypical situation. Using appropriate semantic labels, we can regard a structured text as an abstraction of an item of text.
For example, news reports on corporate acquisitions can be represented as items of structured text using semantic labels including buyer, seller, acquisition, value, and date. Each semantic label provides semantic information, and so an item of structured text is intended to have some semantic coherence. Each phrase in structured text is very simple | such as a proper noun, a date, or a number with unit of measure, or a word or phrase from a prescribed lexicon. For an application, the prescribed lexicon delineates the types of states, actions, and attributes, that could be conveyed by the items of structured text.
Much material is potentially available as structured text. This includes items of text structured using XML tags (see for example GQ99, Pfa99] ), the output from information extraction systems given in templates (see for example CL96, Gri97, ARP98]), and databases used by some online news agencies where journalists le reports as structured text and these entries are used by editors to generate free text news reports in di erent languages. The notion of structured text also overlaps with semi-structured data (for reviews see Abi97, Bun97] ).
Whilst structured text is useful as a resource, there is a need to develop techniques to handle, analyse, and reason with it. We may want to check consistency of structured text with what we already know, and we may want to draw inferences from structured text even if there are inconsistencies between items of structured text and the domain knowledge. To support this, we also require a domain knowledgebase, which may include integrity constraints, default rules (rules that normally hold but can have exceptions), and various database resources.
We have assumed the words and phrases are su ciently simple and restricted to not require natural language processing. In most cases, we will represent each word or phrase by a constant symbol in the logic. For some phrases, we may represent it as a function symbol with constant symbols as arguments (Eg. a date could be a function symbol with arguments for the day, month, and year).
In this paper, we provide basic de nitions for structured text, and for the notion of a stereotype. We then show how structured text can be translated into classical logic to allow reasoning with domain knowledge. We then review some key approaches to reasoning with inconsistent information in knowledgebased systems, and show how we can use them for reasoning with inconsistency in structured text.
Formalizing structured text
In this section we will formalize the notions of structured text and of stereotype.
Structured text
Here we adopt some basic de nitions that should be easy to view as an adaptation of ideas in a variety of elds in XML, relational and object-oriented databases, language engineering, and knowledgebased systems.
De nition 2.1 A word is a string of alphanumeric characters, and a phrase is a string of one or more words. A text entry is either a phrase or a null value. A semantic label is a phrase.
Stereotypes
Essentially, a set of semantic labels, called a stereotype, is used to delineate a recurring situation. A structured report is then an item of structured text where the semantic labels are those of the stereotype 1 . The complex stereotypes on the left of the :: symbol are compulsory stereotypes and the complex stereotypes on the right are optional stereotypes.
We will view a complex feature as being an instance of a complex stereotype if and only if the complex feature is composed of an instance of each of the compulsory stereotypes and possibly an instance of one or more of the optional stereotypes. This is captured in the following de nition. A stereotype is a generalization of a number of concepts in computing including relational database schema, templates in information extraction, and frames in knowledgebased systems.
There is also a similarity between stereotypes and document type declarations (DTDs) in XML. However, DTDs incorporate many implementation features that are not appropriate here such as default values, a form of structural inheritance, and a framework for the surprisingly involved question of handling escape characters.
Logical reasoning with structured text
To represent items of structured text, we adopt classical rst-order logic.
Assumption 3.1 For logical reasoning we assume the usual language of classical rst-order logic using the usual symbols 8 and 9 for quanti cation and the usual symbols^; _; ! and : for logical connectives.
Assumption 3.2 Domain knowledge is some set of classical rst-order formulae.
An item of structured text is isomorphic to a tree. A tree formed from an item of structured text is called a structured text tree. Using the following de nition helps us to consider translations of items of structured text into logical formulae by using a structured text tree as an intermediate.
De nition 3.1 To form a structured text tree from an item of structured text, apply the following two rules exhaustively:
Complex feature rule For a complex feature of the form h : 1 ; ::; n : i, let be the root of the tree, and let each of 1 ; :::; n be used to give a subtree. For each i , if i is a complex feature, apply the complex feature rule by recursion, and if i is an atomic feature, then apply the atomic feature rule.
Atomic feature rule For an atomic feature of the form h : i, let be the root, and let be the child of . The structured text tree generated for Example 3.1. The unique reference label is given in parentheses.
For each node in the structured text tree that is a semantic label, we assume that the node also has a unique reference label.
So each node in the structured text tree is labelled with either a semantic label or a text entry. If a semantic label has come from an atomic feature, then we call it an atomic semantic label, otherwise we call it a complex semantic label. From this de nition, we see that for an item of structured text the following hold: (1) all non-leaf nodes are semantic labels; (2) all leaf nodes are text entries; and (3) all penultimate nodes are atomic semantic labels.
Furthermore, if the item of structured text is a structured report, then we can see the structured text tree excluding the leaves gives the structure of the corresponding stereotype, and the name of the stereotype of the item of structured text is the root of the tree. In the following section, we review key paraconsistent logics, and then in Section 5, we will use paraconsistent logics for reasoning with the logical representation of items of structured text.
Paraconsistent logics for knowledgebased systems
Approaches to inconsistent information include database revision and paraconsistent logics. The rst approach e ectively removes data from the database to produce a new consistent database. In contrast, the second approach leaves the database inconsistent, but prohibits the logics from deriving the trivial inferences that follow from ex falso quodlibet. Unfortunately, the rst approach means we may lose useful information | we may be forced to make a premature selection of our new database, or we may not even be able to make a selection. We focus here on the advantages and disadvantages of key proposals for a paraconsistent approach.
In the following subsections, we consider a range of paraconsistent logics that give sensible inferences from inconsistent information. We consider (1) Weakly-negative logics which use the full classical language, but a subset of the classical proof theory; (2) Four-valued logic which uses a subset of the classical language and a subset of the classical proof theory, together with an intuitive four-valued semantics; (3) Argumentative logics which reason with consistent subsets of classical formulae; and (4) Quasi-classical logic which uses classical proof theory but restricts the notion of a natural deduction proof by prohibiting the application of elimination proof rules after the application of introduction proof rules.
These options behave in quite di erent ways with data. None can be regarded as perfect for handling inconsistent information in general. Rather, they provide a spectrum of approaches. However, in all the approaches we cover, we aim to stay as close to classical reasoning as possible, since classical logic has many appealing features for knowledge representation and reasoning. We therefore do not aim to cover approaches based on defeasible logics or modal logics.
Weakly-negative logics
To avoid trivialization, weakly-negative logics compromise on classical proof theory. They allow, for example, normal notions of conjunction, such as ^ gives , but they are substantially weaker in terms of negation. There are a number of ways in which this can be achieved. One way is to drop some of the axiom schema of classical logic so that ex falso quodlibet and reductio ad absurdum do not hold. One proposal is a paraconsistent logic called C ! logic proposed by da Costa dC74] . Below we give a presentation of C ! . All the schema in the logic C ! are schema in classical logic.
De nition 4.1 The logic C ! is de ned by the following axiom schema together with the modus ponens proof rule.
_ : :: ! This proof theory gives the C ! consequence relation.
Example 4.1 To illustrate the use of C ! , consider the following set of formulae.
f ! ( ^ ); ! ; ! : ; g In this example, there is a symmetry about whether or not is a . In other words, there is an argument that is a , and an argument that is : . Using the proof theory we can derive inferences including ; and . We can also derive both and : .
In C ! , rules such as modus tollens and disjunctive syllogism fail. In this sense weakly-negative logics are sub-systems of classical logic. In particular compromising on negation means that many classical inference steps involving negation fail in weakly-negative logics. Furthermore, the removal of certain classical inference rules means that the propositional connectives in the language do not behave in a classical fashion. In the case of C ! the classical \sense" of negation { and as a result also the interde nability of the classical connectives { has been traded in exchange for non-trivialisation. Weakly-negative logics are useful for rule-based reasoning with information since the logic supports modus ponens. They can be used to give guidance on the nature of an inconsistency and facilitate actions that should be taken on the database. Furthermore, they can be used without recourse to consistency checks. Finally, paraconsistent logics can be used as a formal basis for truth maintenance MS88].
Four-valued logic
The four-valued logic of Belnap Bel77] provides an interesting alternative to the logics presented in the previous section in that it has an illuminating and intuitive semantic characterization to complement its proof theory.
De nition 4.2 The language for four-valued logic is a subset of classical logic. Let P be the usual set of formulae of classical logic that is formed using the connectives :;^and _. Then the set of formulae of the language, denoted Q, is P f ! j ; 2 Pg, and hence implication is not nestable.
De nition 4.3 A formula in the language can be one of \true", \false", \both" or \neither", which we denote by the symbols T, F, B, and N, respectively.
Example 4.3 For the database f ; : ; g, an acceptable assignment of truth values is such that is B, : is B, is T, and is N.
Intuitively we can view this form of assignment in terms of an \Approximation" lattice (see Figure  2 (left)). As more \information" is obtained about a formula, the truth-value \increases". In other words, if we know nothing about a formula, it is N. Then as we gain some information, it becomes either T or F. Finally, if we gain too much information it becomes B.
De nition 4.4 For the semantics, we assume a distributive lattice, the \Logical" lattice (see There is no 2 Q such that the semantic assignment function always assigns the value T. However, there are formulae that never take the value F, for example _: . Though the set of formulae that never take the value F is not closed under conjunction. For example, consider ( _ : )^ ( _ : ) when is N and is B.
To complement the semantics, the following is a de nition for the proof theory for four-valued logic.
De nition 4.6 Let ; ; 2 L. The following are the proof rules for four-valued logic. Let $ signify that and are semantically equivalent, and can be intersubstituted in any context. 
In addition, the following extends the de nition of the proof theory. Four-valued logic provides a natural and intuitive form of paraconsistent reasoning. The semantic characterization based on the approximation lattice and logical lattice could be applicable for reasoning with facts. In particular, the logic seems useful for aggregating con icting information. However, there are problems with reasoning with rules, particularly with respect to the lack of modus ponens and disjunctive syllogism. As with weakly-negative logics, the four-valued proof theory can be used without recourse to consistency checks.
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There is a range of proposals for logics that are based on increasing 
Argument systems
One of the most obvious strategies for handling inconsistency in a database is to reason with consistent subsets of the database. This is closely related to the approach of removing information from the database that is causing an inconsistency. Here, we explore some of the issues relating these approaches in the context of classical proof theory.
De nition 4.7 Let be a database. Then: A problem with using inferences from consistent subsets of an inconsistent database is that they are only weakly justi ed in general. To handle this problem, we can adopt the notion of an argument from a database, and a notion of acceptability of an argument. An argument is a subset of the database, together with an inference from that subset. Using the notion of acceptability, the set of all arguments can be partitioned into sets of (arguments of) di erent degrees of acceptability. This can then be used to de ne a class of consequence relations (see for example BDP93, EGH95]).
De nition 4.8 Let be a database. An argument from is a pair, ( ; ), such that and ` . An argument is consistent, if is consistent. We denote the set of arguments from as An( ), where An( ) = f( ; )j ^ ` g. ? is an argument set of i ? An( ).
De nition 4.9 Let be a database. Let ( ; ) and ( ; ) be any arguments constructed from . If` $ : , then ( ; ) is a rebutting defeater of ( ; ). If 2 and` $ : , then ( ; ) is an undercutting defeater of ( ; ).
Rebutting defeat, as de ned here, is a symmetrical relation. One way of changing this is by use of priorities, such as in systems based on explicit representation of preference (eg Bre89, CRS93, BDP95]), or as in systems based on speci city (eg Poo85]).
For a database , an argumentative structure is any set of subsets of An( ). The intention behind the de nition for an argumentative structure is that di erent subsets of An( ) have di erent degrees of acceptability. Below, we present one particular argumentative structure A , and then explain how the de nition captures notions of acceptability.
De nition 4.10 The following sets constitute the argumentative structure A , where is a database.
AT( ) = f(;; )j;` g AF( ) = f( ; )j FREE( )^ ` g AB( ) = f( ; )j 2 CON( )^ ` ^(8 2 MC( ); 2 ` )g ARU( ) = f( ; )j 2 CON( )^ ` ( 8 2 MC( ) 6 : )^(8 2 MC( ); 2 6 : )g AU( ) = f( ; )j 2 CON( )^ ` ^(8 2 MC( ); 2 6 : )g A8( ) = f( ; )j 2 CON( )^ ` ^(8 2 MC( ) ` )g AR( ) = f( ; )j 2 CON( )^ ` ^(8 2 MC( ) 6 : )g A9( ) = f( ; )j 2 CON( )^ ` g
The naming conventions for the argument sets are motivated as follows. T is for the tautological arguments -i.e. those that follow from the empty set of premises. F is for the free arguments -(due to Benferhat et al BDP93]) -which are the arguments that follow from the data that is free of inconsistencies. B is for the backed arguments -i.e. those for which all the premises follow from all the maximally consistent subsets of the data. RU is for the arguments that are not subject to either rebutting or undercutting. U is for the arguments that are not subject to undercutting. 8 is for the universal arguments -(essentially due to Manor and Rescher MR70], where it was called inevitable arguments) -which are the arguments that follow from all maximally consistent subsets of the data. R is for the arguments that are not subject to rebutting. 9 is for existential arguments -(essentially due to Manor and Rescher MR70]) -which are the arguments with consistent premises.
The de nitions for A9, AF, AT should be clear. We therefore focus on the remainder. AR allows an argument ( ; ) only if there is no maximally consistent subset that gives : . AU allows an argument ( ; ) only if for all items in , there is no maximally consistent subset that gives : . ARU combines the conditions of the AR and AU. Notice that AR and A8 have very similar de nitions, with the only di erence being \ 6 : " in AR versus \ ` " in A8. A similar remark applies to AU and AB. Therefore A8 and AB are strengthenings of AR and AU, respectively (i.e. \6 : " replaced with \` "). We summarize the relationship between these sets in the diagram in Figure 3 . The main features to notice are that A is a linear structure, and that there is an equivalence of AF, AB, ARU, and AU. Example 4.6 We give an example of a database, and some of the items in each argument set. Take = f ; : g. Then (f ; : g; ^: ) 2 An( ), (f g; ) 2 A9( ), (f g; _ ) 2 AR( ), if 6 , (fg; _ : ) 2 A8( ). Furthermore, A8( ) = AF( ) = AB( ) = ARU( ) = AU( ) = AT( ).
Example 4.7 As another example, consider = f: ^ ; ^ g. Then for = f ^ g, ( ; ) 2 A9( ), ( ; ) 2 AR( ), and ( ; ) 2 A8( ). But there is no such that ( ; ) 2 AU( ), ( ; ) 2 ARU( ), ( ; ) 2 AB( ), or ( ; ) 2 AF( ).
Each argument set in A induces a consequence relation. De nition 4.11 A consequence closure for each argumentative structure is denoted Cx, where x 2 fT; F; B; RU; U; 8;R;9; ng, and de ned as follows, Cx( ) = f j9 ( ; ) 2 Ax( )g A consequence relation, denoted`x, can then be generated from the consequence closure as expected.
`x i 2 Cx( )
The argumentative logics are, in a key sense, far more restricted than the other paraconsistent logics considered in this review: If a pair of formulae are mutually inconsistent, then none of these argumentative logics will derive any consequences from the conjunction of the two formulae (as an example see Example 4.8). This is not the case with any of the weakly-negative, four-valued or quasi-classical logics. Another signi cant drawback is the computational complexity of reasoning with argumentative logics since the reasoning is based on consistency checking.
Example 4.8 Consider f ^ ; : ^( ! g. There is no consistent subset which gives the inference . In a sense, is locked into the inconsistency.
The concept of an argumentative structure, with the two notions of argument and acceptability, are a convenient framework for developing practical reasoning tools. Although, they are based on simple de nitions of arguments and acceptability, the concepts carry many possibilities for further re nement. It remains to be seen whether there is a general taxonomy of argumentative structures, such as suggested by Pinkas and Loui PL92], and universal properties of the logics that they induce.
There are also a number of other argument-based systems that have been proposed, including . These di er from argumentative logics in that they focus on defeasible reasoning: They incorporate defeasible, or probabilistic, connectives into their languages, together with associated machinery.
Another approach to acceptability of arguments is by Dung Dun95] . This approach assumes a set of arguments, and a binary \attacks" relation between pairs of subsets of arguments. A hierarchy of arguments is then de ned in terms of the relative attacks \for" and \against" each argument in each subset of arguments. In this way, for example, the plausibility of an argument could be defended by another argument in its subset.
The common feature in argument systems is that they incorporate formal representation of individual arguments and techniques for comparing con icting arguments. In these frameworks, if there are a number of arguments for and against a particular conclusion, an aggregation function determines whether the conclusion holds in the framework. These aggregation functions can be described as being binary since they just consider the existence of arguments for and against, and so they are not sensitive to the number of arguments for or against.
Quasi-classical logic
As we have seen with weakly-negative logics and with four-valued logics, the weakening of the proof theory means that the connectives do not behave in a classical fashion. To address this, an alternative called quasi-classical logic has been proposed by Besnard and Hunter BH95, Hun99a] . In this, the proof theory is restricted so that the application of introduction rules cannot be followed by the application of elimination rules. The proof theory allows any formula to be rewritten into CNF (using distributivity, associativity, de Morgan's laws, double negation elimination, and arrow elimination 2 ), and for conjunction elimination and resolution to be applied. From the resulting resolvents, the following rules can be applied to obtain an inference: distributivity, associativity, de Morgan's laws, double negation introduction, conjunction introduction, disjunction introduction, and arrow introduction 3 .
Example 4. QC logic is motivated by the need to handle beliefs rather than the need to address issues of verisimilitude for given propositions. The aim is for a logic of beliefs in the \real-world" rather than a logic of truths in the real-world. In this logic, we can regard each formula as a belief.
The heart of the QC proof theory is resolution. Resolution can be regarded as a process of focusing beliefs. So a resolvent is more focused than the clause : _ . Similarly, for the pair of beliefs _ and : _ , the resolvent _ is more focused. In general, a clause is more focused than a clause if Atoms( ) Atoms( ). Hence, as one or more applications of resolution decomposes a set of assumptions, it focuses the beliefs from the assumptions.
A useful property of resolution is that is a resolvent only if all the literals used in are literals used in the set of assumptions (assuming, of course, that resolution is the only proof rule used). This means that any resolvent, and hence any belief from the assumptions, is a non-trivial inference from the assumptions. This holds even if the set of assumptions is classically inconsistent. As a result, resolution can constitute the basis of useful paraconsistent reasoning. Restricting the proofs so that the introduction proof rules are not followed by the elimination proof rules, as discussed above, means that the paraconsistent reasoning is preserved. Now, we introduce the following de nition for a model.
De nition 4.12 Let A be the set of atoms in the language for QC logic. Let O be the set of objects de ned as follows, where + is a positive object, and ? is a negative object. O = f+ j 2 Ag f? j 2 Ag Any X 2 }(O) is a model. So + 2 X means that in X there is a reason for the belief and that in X there is a reason against the belief : . Similarly, ? 2 X means that in X there is a reason against the belief and that in X there is a reason for the belief : .
A model just contains reasons for/against beliefs | it incorporates no notion of truth or falsity. Since we can allow both an atom and its complement to be satis able, we have decoupled, at the level of the model, the link between a formula and its complement. We now consider a key part of the de nition for the satis ability relation for the logic.
De nition 4.13 Let j = s be a satis ability relation, called strong satisfaction. For X 2 }(O), we de ne j = s as follows, and 1 ; :::; n are literals in L, and is an atom in L. The rst two parts of this de nition covers literals. The third part covers disjunction. This definition for disjunction is more restricted than the classical de nition. In addition to at least one disjunct being satis able, there is also a notion of focusing incorporated into the de nition. Essentially, for each disjunct i in the formula, 1 _ ::: _ n , if the model satis es the complement i of that disjunct, then the model must also satisfy the focused formula Focus( 1 _:::_ n ; i ), where the focused formula is just the original formula without the disjunct i . The de nition for satisfaction is easily extended to any formula of the language, and we can use it for a de nition for entailment.
The reason we need this de nition for disjunction that is more restricted than the classical version, is that we have decoupled the link between a formula and its negation in the model. Therefore, in order to provide a meaning for resolution, we need to put the link between each disjunct, and its complement, into the de nition for disjunction. As a result, to ensure a clause is satis able, we need to ensure that if necessary, every more focused clause is also satis able.
Example 4.10 Let = f(: _: )_ ; : _ ; : g, where ; ; 2 A, and let X = f? ; ? ; ? g. So X j = s : , X j = s : and X j = s : . Hence, X j = s : _ , X j = s : _ , and X j = s : _ : . Finally, X j = s (: _ : ) _ . So every formula in is satis able in X.
The QC consequence relation o ers many more non-tautological inferences from data than either the weakly-negative or four-valued logics. For example, via disjunctive syllogism, QC logic gives from f: ; _ g, whereas neither the weakly-negative logic C ! nor the four-valued logic gives .
In addition, there is a form of relevancy in the reasoning. If there is an inference of from some assumption, then there is at least one propositional atom in common between and the assumptions.
Developing a non-trivializable, or paraconsistent logic, necessitates some compromise, or weakening, of classical logic. The compromises imposed to give QC logic seem to be more appropriate than other paraconsistent logics for applications in computing. QC logic provides a means to obtain all the non-trivial resolvents from a set of formulae, without the problem of trivial clauses also following. Furthermore, QC logic is tractable unlike argumentative logics. Though the constraints on QC logic result in tautologies from an empty set of assumptions being non-derivable, this is not usually a problem for applications.
Whilst all paraconsistent logics fail to adhere to all the properties of the classical consequence relation, QC logic does fail a particularly signi cant combination of these properties. In particular, the following properties do not hold for the QC consequence relation:
` and ` ! implies `Q right modus ponens f g`Q implies `Q ! conditionalization `Q ! implies f g`Q deduction f g`Q and ?`Q implies ?`Q cut `Q and` ! implies `Q right weakening
Failure of these properties can be detrimental for some applications. However, for applications where inferences are obtained as a one-step process, for example in a system that just provides a user with inferences from an item of structured text, these properties are often not required.
Paraconsistent reasoning with structured text
Now we have reviewed key approaches to paraconsistent reasoning, we return to the question of paraconsistent reasoning with structured text. First, we summarize the application requirements. We assume we have a set of items of structured text, and that we will represent these by a set of positive literals. We also assume that we have domain knowledge represented by a set of classical formulae. In addition, let us assume that we are using paraconsistent reasoning to look at the structured text, to identify possible inferences from the structured text and domain knowledge, and let us also assume the domain knowledge is consistent.
To illustrate, we will consider weather reports in the form of structured text. In this application we may assume some scienti c knowledge about the nature of weather. We will regard this scienti c knowledge as the domain knowledge. We will also assume that the aim of paraconsistent reasoning with the weather reports is to nd useful inferences from each weather report and perhaps to merge information from the reports. We look at this example in more detail below.
We have considered four options for paraconsistent reasoning, namely C ! logic, four-valued logic, quasi-classical logic, and argumentative logics. We summarize the pros and cons of each of these options for handling structured text as follows, taking into account the application requirements we have assumed:
C ! could be too weak for reasoning with domain knowledge. In particular key classical proof rules such as modus tollens and disjunctive syllogism do not hold and various classical equivalences do not hold. This means that unless there is a full appreciation of the intricacies of the proof theory, it will be di cult to engineer a knowledgebase to behave as expected. As a simple example, if a clause is inserted into the knowledgebase using disjunction as opposed to implication, then obvious inferences that would follow by modus ponens would not follow by resolution. Another problem with this logic is that there is no quali cation of inferences. Four-valued logic could be useful for aggregating information about literals, but the proof theory is too weak for reasoning with domain knowledge. In particular the notion of implication is much weaker than the classical notion, and there are no proof rules such as modus ponens or resolution. Whilst there is some quali cation of inferences, via truth values, it only says whether or not there is a con ict. Argumentative logics give useful inferences that are intuitive plus there is a quali cation of these inferences. The proof theory is based on classical logic, and in many respects these logics behave as classical logic. There is no need to restrict the language of the domain knowledge, and so long as the domain knowledge is consistent, then there is no problem with knowledge being locked into formulae. In other words, under these conditions argumentative logics are ideal 4 . Furthermore, the inferences are quali ed. Quasi-classical is in some respects more powerful 5 than argumentative logics and quali cation can be incorporated as discussed in HN98]. However, if we assume that the domain knowledge is consistent and correct, then quasi-classical logic does not seem necessary. Though, the computational complexity of QC logic is signi cantly better than argumentative logics. If we were to allow inconsistent domain knowledgebases, then QC logic would be ideal.
The net conclusion we can draw from this is that argumentative logics are ideal for reasoning with structured text if we assume that the domain knowledge is consistent.
Since each item of structured text is represented by a set of positive literals, we can only obtain an inconsistency in a structured report, or in a set of structured reports, by reasoning with domain knowledge. So each inconsistency in a structured report is de ned with respect to the domain knowledge, and as we will see we need to axiomatize this inconsistency. Some of the axiomatization may involve unique name axioms and domain closure axioms that are de ned using the appropriate stereotypes.
Now to illustrate using argumentative logics for reasoning with inconsistency in structured text, we will consider the problem of the following two con icting weather reports. As we saw in Section 4.3, there is a range of argumentative logics. However, they are all based on reasoning with maximally consistent subsets. So we can use the argumentative logics in parallel by nding these subsets, drawing all existential arguments, and then qualifying them according to whether they are also universal, backed, etc.
5 By \more powerful", we mean that amongest some of the advantageous properties of quasi-classical logic, information does not get locked into inconsistent subsets of formulae (cf. argmentative logics with Example 4.8).
hweather report: hsource Let us assume we have the following domain knowledge for identifying inconsistency in weather reports: So for example from today(r1,sun) and today(r2,sun), we get today(r1+r2,sun+sun), and hence today(r1+r2,sun). Now we return to qualifying inferences. Using this example we obtain today(r1+r2,sun) as a free inference from , whereas tomorrow(r1,sun) and tomorrow(r2,rain) are existential inferences from . Now suppose we have the followng further formulae in the domain knowledge: 8X(tomorrow(X; sun) ! :snow-is-forecast-tomorrow) 8X(tomorrow(X; rain) ! :snow-is-forecast-tomorrow) Also suppose we restrict universal inferences to maximally consistent subsets that contain all domain knowledge, then all maximally consistent subsets imply :snow-is-forcast-tomorrow, and so this inference is a universal inference. The reason we need to restrict the universal inferences is that we are assuming the domain knowledge is consistent and \correct". So if the union of the domain knowledge and structured text is inconsistent, then we assume it is because the structured text contains inaccuracies. Hence, we adopt the following de nition of univeral inference: Let be the domain knowledge, and let ? be the formulae representing the structured text, then is a universal inference from ( ; ?) i is an inference from every set in f ? 0 j ? 0 is a maximal subset of ? such that ? 0 is consistentg.
Analysing and acting on inconsistency
Paraconsistent reasoning is only really useful as part of a wider framework for inconsistency handling. Here we consider two key aspects of inconsistency handling that incorporate paraconsistent reasoning. These are analysing inconsistency and acting on inconsistency.
Analysing inconsistency
Analysis of inconsistency is needed to make better informed decisions on how to handle an inconsistency. In HN98], we propose the use of labelled QC logic that records and tracks information used in reasoning. Proof rules of labelled QC logic can be used to track inconsistent information by propagating these labels (and their associated information) during reasoning. Using this approach we can provide a \logical analysis" of inconsistent information. We can identify the likely sources of the problem, and use this to suggest appropriate actions. This \auditing" is essential if we are to facilitate further development in the presence of inconsistency.
In GH98, Hun99b], we explore further techniques for analysing sets of inconsistent information. In particular, we give measures of inconsistency for a set of formulae and use this for de ning ways to say \a set (of classical formulae) is more inconsistent than a set " and to say \a set is more inconsistent with a set ? than a set is with ?". These measures are based on features of a set of formulae include: the number of minimally inconsistent subsets; the number of maximally inconsistent subsets; the number of atomic symbols occuring in the minimally inconsistent subsets; the proportion of formulae occurring in a minimally inconsistent subset; and the proportion of formulae in more than one minimally inconsistent subset. These measures can be useful in describing inconsistency in prioritizing resolution tasks, and in particular in selecting appropriate actions.
In the context of structured text, such as weather reports, analysis might include trying to identify certain factors that could be the root of the inconsistencies. For example, we may nd that one newspaper may frequently con ict with domain knowledge, and so should be regarded with increased doubt. Or we may nd that a number of newspapers may largely agree for four out of the next ve days, but on one day they signi cantly disagree | in this case we may regard that predicting the weather for that day is subject to a high degree of uncertainty and so prone to error. ]. Yet we may not always want to immediately restore inconsistency. Since by restoring inconsistency, we may lose valuable information. We may want to harbour the inconsistency until we are better able to resolve it. This may involve seeking further information or advice.
Acting on inconsistency
In GH91, GH93] we argue that dealing with inconsistencies is not necessarily done by restoring consistency but by supplying rules telling one how to act when the inconsistency arises. To illustrate, we can continue with the example of weather reports. For acting on inconsistency in a set of weather reports, we can choose to ignore some reports because they come from less reliable sources, or we can seek more up to date information by say switching on the radio, or we can seek more authoritative information by phoning a government weather service, or if there is a high degree of con ict we may just proceed in the basis that the worst case weather will occur.
E ective action in the presence of inconsistencies requires gathering a wider appreciation of the nature and context of these inconsistencies. If we accept that acting in the presence of inconsistency requires external input, we can adopt a meta-level approach to prescribe inconsistency handling rules of the form: Inconsistency implies Action.
One approach is to deploy an action-based temporal logic that allows us to specify the past context and source of an inconsistency in order to prescribe future actions to handle the inconsistency GH93, FGH + 94]. We can consider actions as being: (1) Ignoring the inconsistency completely and continuing development regardless; (2) Circumventing the inconsistent parts of the speci cation being developed and continuing development; (3) Removing the inconsistency altogether by correcting any mistakes or resolving con icts; and (4) Ameliorating the inconsistent situations by performing actions that \improve" these situations and increase the possibility of future resolution.
Discussion
In this paper, we have focused on paraconsistent reasoning with structured text. There are many proposals for logics for paraconsistent reasoning. Here we have reviewed some of the main approaches and compared them with respect to an application in technology for structured text. From this comparison, we see that there are some useful logics for reasoning with inconsistency in structured text. This o ers a formal basis for addressing the con icts that normally arise in information such as news reports.
Argumentative logics give useful inferences that are intuitive plus there is a quali cation of these inferences. Four-valued logic is too weak for reasoning with domain knowledge | in particular the notion of implication is much weaker than the classical notion | and inferences are only quali ed according to whether or not there is a con ict. C ! could be too weak for reasoning with domain knowledge | in particular key classical proof rules such as modus tollens and disjunctive syllogism do not hold | and there is no quali cation of inferences.
Quasi-classical logic is in some respects more powerful than argumentative logics | in particular if the domain knowledge is inconsistent | and quali cation can be incorporated as discussed in HN98].
Structured text is a general concept implicit in many approaches to handling textual information in computing | including tagged text in XML, text in relational and object-oriented databases, and output from information extraction systems. Structured text can be naturally viewed in logic. Each item of structured text can be represented by a formula of classical logic. This means that consistency checking and inferencing can be undertaken with structured text using domain knowledge. Given the vast amount of information that is potentially available in the form of structured text, in particular news reports, it is possible that analysis and alerting tools based on paraconsistent logics, together with tools based on defeasible reasoning Hun00] and tools for merging reports Hun98], could become a valuable technology.
